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TIGHTENING THE DEFENSE AGAINST OFFENSIVE
SPORTS AGENTS
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT* AND J. MARK RODGERS**
4 A GENTS," it has been said, "are the most destructive force in
1-t3 sports."' They have also been called vipers,2 parasites, 3 char-
latans,4 vultures,5 bloodsuckers, 6 and leeches.7 One writer accounted,
"Like serpents they infest the gardens and groves of American sport,
poised to strike at the wealth professional athletes earn in such plenty.''8
Said one professional athlete, "They're all bad-all agents." 9
* Ladd Professor of Evidence, Florida State University, College of Law; B.S., 1962, Iowa
State University; J.D., 1964, University of Iowa. Professor Ehrhardt currently is serving as the
Faculty Athletics Representative to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) from
Florida State University, and was elected chairman of the Faculty Athletics Representatives As-
sociation at the NCAA Annual Convention in January 1989. The views expressed in this Article
are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the NCAA or Florida
State University.
** Associate Attorney, Steel Hector & Davis, West Palm Beach, Florida. B.S., 1981; J.D.,
1987, Florida State University. Mr. Rodgers is a member of the Sports Lawyers Association, the
American Bar Association Forum Committee on Entertainment and Sports Industries, and rep-
resents athletes as a certified contract advisor with the National Football League Players Associ-
ation.
1. INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRO-
FESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. Rep. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1977) (statement by Harrison
Vickers, Houston Aeros).
2. Neff, Den of Vipers, A Sports Scourge: Bad Agents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19,
1987, at 76.
3. Id.
4. Powers, Coaches, Athletes Are Artful Hustlers, Too, The Sporting News, Nov. 16,
1987, at 12, col. 1.
5. USA Today, Jan. 26, 1988, at 7C, col. 3. The term "vultures" was used by Mike Gott-
fried, the head football coach at the University of Pittsburgh, who began a crusade against
agents in January 1988. The University of Pittsburgh lost one of its outstanding football players,
Craig "Ironhead" Heyward, when, after his junior season, Heyward made the decision to turn
professional. Heyward had one year of collegiate eligibility remaining at Pittsburgh. Gottfried
believed Heyward made the decision to leave school after consulting with a sports agent. Pitts-
burgh lost Heyward only a few months after players Charles Gladman and Teryl Austin were
declared ineligibile for collegiate competition when it was discovered that the two had accepted
money from an agent. Austin subsequently was reinstated. Id. at cols. 2-3.
Heyward's leaving prompted Gottfried to respond, "These agents stalk the players like vul-
tures and prey on their innocence." Id. at col. 3. Gottfried stated, "I'd like to apologize to the
bird species for connecting these two." Id. at 9C, col. 1.
6. Orlando Sentinel, June 12, 1988, at C-10, col. 1.
7. Id.
8. Neff, supra note 2, at 76.
9. Id.
SPORTS AGENTS ACT
The truth is, not all sports agents are bad. Some-the ones rarely
publicized-are competent, honest, and trustworthy. However, there is
a substantial number who are unscrupulous, deceitful, and a severe
threat to athletes and organized sports, both amateur and professional.
This latter group has drawn the scorn and contempt toward the profes-
sion which prevails today and has attracted the keen interest of state
lawmakers.
In 1988, twelve states, including Florida, passed legislation which will
make the sports agent and, in some cases, the athlete, accountable for
indiscretions against colleges and universities.' 0 The total number of
states with agent legislation stands at seventeen." Additionally, several
states have either considered or currently have similar legislation pend-
ing.1 2
This Article examines the reasons for this rash of legislation. The au-
thors begin by exploring the background of sports agency and outlining
the positive effects that competent agents can produce for athletes. Also
examined are the bad agents, those who ignore rules, laws, and regula-
tions in pursuit of personal wealth. The authors outline legislation which
has been passed to curtail and control unscrupulous agents. Finally, the
authors review Florida's new law, which places a burden on the athlete
and the agent.
I. BACKGROUND: TBE ATHLETE AND T=E AGENT
The adage is worn but accurate: All you need to be an agent is a
client. Indeed, it is that truth which begins to describe the wide spectrum
of humanity that represents professional athletes. Attorneys, account-
ants, stockbrokers, ex-coaches, insurance agents, retired professional
athletes, college professors, a dry-cleaning manager, a kosher caterer,
and a dentist, are only a sampling of the estimated 2,000 to 20,000 peo-
ple who call themselves "sports agents."'" It is a simple vocation: no
10. Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. See infra notes 84-223 and accompanying text.
11. In addition to the 12 states listed supra note 12, Alabama, California, Lousiana, Okla-
homa and Texas have passed agent legislation. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
12. The NCAA News has compiled a list of pending legislation related to the regulation of
athlete agents. The compilation includes: Arizona (S. 1011), Nebraska (L. 224), New Jersey (A.
3002), New York (A.. 5765, S. 6310), South Carolina (H. 3348, S. 1057), Virginia (H. 1617, H.
1105), Washington (S. 6225). See NCAA News, Aug. 31, 1988, at 13-14; id., Feb. 8, 1989, at 14-
15.
13. Sobel, The Regulation of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 701,
703 (1987); Steinberg, Time to Revise Game Rules?, The Sporting News, Nov. 16, 1987, at 10,
col. 1.
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educational or professional credentials are necessary, nor are skill, train-
ing or knowledge."
A. Why an Athlete Hires an Agent
Professional sports is big business and its wealthiest beneficiaries are
the athletes. The average annual salaries in the four major professional
sports leagues provide sound testimony:
LEAGUE AVERAGE ANNUAL SALARY
National Basketball Association $ 587,00011
Major League Baseball $ 438,00016
National Football League $ 240,0017
National Hockey League $ 188,00018
And the above are just averages. Consider that professional basketball
players Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and Ervin "Magic" Johnson, teammates
on the Los Angeles Lakers, each earned salaries of $2.5 million for the
1987-1988 season.' 9 New York Mets catcher Gary Carter garnered
$2,360,714 for the 1988 baseball season, making him one of eleven Ma-
jor League Baseball players to earn at least $2 million during the sea-
son. 0 Seventy-one Major League Baseball players earned at least $1
million. 2' At $1,391,750, Bo Jackson was the highest paid player in the
National Football League (NFL) in 1987; additionally, he earned an-
other $533,000 as an outfielder for the Kansas City Royals in 1988. 22
Those salaries are not gifts. Many are the product of tedious, calcu-
lated, and methodical planning. Comparable to other high stakes busi-
ness negotiations, sports contract negotiations can entail bitter and
exhaustive wrangling which may drag on for months and, in some cases,
years. Additionally, the complexities of a multi-million dollar, multi-
14. Kohn, Sports Agents Representing Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having to
Say You're Qualified, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 1988, at 1. Bob Woolf, the
pioneer of sports agents, has negotiated more than 2,000 contracts during his 25-year career. He
recognizes the loose credentials of his profession: "Anybody today can become an agent. You
can be on your way to jail or getting out.... Thank God there are some good ones out there.
But a lot are irresponsible." Orlando Sentinel, June 12, 1988, at C-10, col. 1. See Shulruff, The
FootballLawyers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 46.
15. Fichtenbaum, Rosenblatt & Sandomir, How Golden the Goose, SPORTS INC., Jan. 2,
1989, at 29 [hereinafter How Golden the Goose].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Levine, The Sport 100 Salary Report, SPORT, June 1988, at 23-24.
20. USA Today, Oct. 13, 1988, at IC, col. 2.
21. Id.
22. Levine, supra note 19, at 25.
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year contract can demand a sophisticated understanding of income
taxes, annuities, salary deferments, incentive bonuses, injury protection,
and the collective bargaining process. For expertise on these and other
matters inherent to large salaries, an athlete hires an agent.23
The emergence of the sports agent, a relatively recent phenomenon in
sports, was spawned by the historic unfairness athletes encountered at
the bargaining table 4 Matched against shrewd general managers, play-
ers who possess minimal bargaining power and even less negotiation ex-
perience often had little choice but to accept a team's low salary offer.25
But that imbalance began to shift in the late 1960s. Increased revenue
from network television, competition from rival leagues, and free
agency in baseball, forced teams who wanted to remain competitive to
crack their vaults.2 Athletes, at the behest of their new found agents,
leaped inside and stuffed their pockets. Not by coincidence, as more and
more athletes hired agents, average salaries soared. 27 Clearly, agents
proved a decisive advantage for the athlete. 28
23. Generally, the word agent is "used to describe a person authorized by another to act on
his account and under his control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I comment e (1958).
For purposes of this Article, the word "agent" will be synonomous with sports agent, athlete
agent, and player representative. For background information on sports agents, see generally
Kohn, supra note 14; Massey, The Crystal Cruise Cut Short: A Survey of the Increasing Regula-
tory Influences Over the Athlete-Agent in the National Football League, 1 ENT. & SPORTS L. J.
53 (1984); Ruxin, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Student-Athlete, The NCAA, and Agents, 8
J.C. & U.L. 347 (1981-1982); Sobel, supra note 13; Note, Agents of Professional Athletes, 15
NEw ENG. L. REV. 545 (1980); Note, The Agent-Athlete Relationship in Professional and Ama-
teur Sports: The Inherent Potential for Abuse and the Need For Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV.
815 (1981).
24. Before 1968, NFL teams did not allow players to be accompanied by their advisors
during contract negotiations. Sobel, supra note 13, at 703 n.3.
25. Neff, supra note 2, at 76. "'A player who did not have much experience in the business
world was completely outmanned in his negotiations with the general managers."' Id. (quoting
Tom Condon).
26. Id.
27. For example, in 1967, the average major league baseball player earned $19,000; by
1988, the average salary had ballooned to $438,000. How Golden the Goose, supra note 15, at
29.
Another example of skyrocketing salaries in professional sports is found in the number of
millionaires-that is, athletes who earn at least $1 million in one calendar year. In 1982, 23
professional athletes earned at least $1 million. In 1988, the number of professional athletes
earning $1 million or more was 118. Levine, supra note 19, at 23.
28. A House of Representatives Select Committee on Professional Sports held hearings in
1977 to learn more about issues affecting professional sports. One of the topics was sports
agents. The committee heard from three full-time player agents, an executive director of a play-
ers' association who was also a player agent, three player association executives, team owners,
and league officials. INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT CONMT-
TEE ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-79 (1977). In its
final report, the Committee wrote:
[P]layer agents are now generally accepted as a permanent, highly visible, and at times
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B. The Agent's Role
Sports agents today perform four primary tasks: negotiate the ath-
lete's employment agreement; secure, negotiate and review commercial
opportunities; provide financial advice and income management; and
counsel on legal and tax matters.2 9 Performed ethically and competently,
these services maximize an athlete's earning power during the relatively
short period when the athlete is physically able to compete on the pro-
fessional level.
1. Negotiation of Employment Agreement
Generally, an athlete's primary source of income is derived from the
salary paid to him by his team. The employment contract, therefore,
must be negotiated with great care. An effective agent can-through re-
search and market studies of comparable salaries-determine the value
of a player's services to a team and, in turn, attempt to persuade the
team of that value.30 Additionally, the agent must attempt to fashion a
compensation package that best meets the player's needs.3 Finally, the
agent can ensure that the athlete's rights and interests stipulated under
the league's collective bargaining agreement are protected. 32
Utilizing an agent to negotiate the employment agreement also allows
the athlete to be shielded from the often intense bickering inherent in the
negotiation process. Especially prevalent during the negotiation of a vet-
eran player's contract is a team's accentuation of a player's deficiencies
and weaknesses in support of its salary offer. This, of course, is a fun-
damental negotiation strategy. However, by employing an agent, the
athlete is insulated from those comments which can generate ill will to-
ward his team.
2. Additional Income Opportunities
The popularity of sports in our society provides an additional eco-
nomic opportunity for athletes through commercial endorsements and
other public appearances. However, few of these opportunities come un-
positively beneficial, element in the sports labor relations process. . . . Today there is
recognition of the benefits in negotiating personal services contracts with a knowl-
edgeable, competent representative rather than with a youthful or unsophisticated ath-
lete, his parent or a friend of the family.
Id. at 70-71, reprinted in Sobel, supra note 13, at 709.
29. See generally Sobel, supra note 13, at 705-09.
30. Ruxin, supra note 23, at 355.
31. Id.
32. Sobel, supra note 13, at 706.
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solicited. Therefore, the athlete's agent can test the athlete's marketabil-
ity and pursue potential interests on behalf of the athlete.
Once commercial opportunities are located, the agent's responsibility
has only begun. An evaluation of the opportunity will determine
whether it best suits the image and personality. Additionally, a contract
must be negotiated which fairly compensates the athlete and thoroughly
protects his rights and concerns.
3. Financial Advice and Income Management
The ability to command large salaries brings with it the burden of
managing and investing the income. Generally inexperienced in these
matters, some athletes utilize their agent as a financial advisor who
ideally helps the athlete choose the most sound investment opportunities
consistent with a long-term plan for financial security. Some agents also
are employed as money managers and business managers with responsi-
bility for paying the athlete's bills and allotting the athlete a monthly
allowance for living and personal expenses. 3
4. Legal Matters
Many agents are not lawyers. Thus, while an agent may be quite com-
petent to negotiate the principal terms of a player contract or endorse-
ment agreement, the prudent agent will hire a lawyer to review and
refine the agreement and to draft the contract. Additionally, an agent
will retain a tax lawyer for advice and analysis on the income tax conse-
quences of a proposed transaction.4
II. THE BAD AGENT
Ideally, an agent's principal role is to maximize the athlete's earning
potential while establishing a foundation for the athlete's lifetime finan-
cial stability. The agent's responsibility is that of a fiduciary.35 However,
some agents-lost in their zeal to cash in on the big business of sports-
have abandoned their professional and moral responsibilities.
33. Id. at 708.
34. Id. at 709.
35. A fiduciary is defined as "[a] person having duty, created by his undertaking, to act
primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking. As an adjective it
means . . . relating to or founded upon a trust or confidence." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 563
(5th ed. 1979).
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Until recently, the most prevalent problems associated with a bad
agent were income mismanagement,3 6 excessive fees,37 conflicts of in-
terest,38 and incompetence.3 9 These problems attracted the attention of
lawmakers, players associations, and special interest groups, who con-
centrated their efforts on formulating regulations that controlled the
agent and protected the athlete within the athlete-agent relationship.40
However, beginning in March 1987, the sporting world painfully dis-
covered that the athlete was not the only party who required protec-
tion from the unscrupulous agent. Entire universities trembled as
agents, stampeding over themselves to recruit new clients, threatened
the foundation of collegiate athletics. College administrators, athletic
departments, and coaching staffs were cast as the newest victims of
the bad agent, who ignored collegiate eligibility and amateur status in
pursuit of personal riches.4 1
A. The Recruiting War
The proliferation of agents in professional sports has accelerated
competition for clients. And the word competition is an understate-
ment; it is more accurately described as war.42
36. Sobel, supra note 13, at 710. Stories are legendary about professional athletes losing
large amounts of money entrusted to their agents. Most notable, perhaps, is the saga of profes-
sional basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, the longtime center for the Los Angeles Lakers.
In 1987, Abdul-Jabbar filed a $59 million lawsuit against his former business manager, Tom
Collins. In the complaint, Abdul-Jabbar charged Collins and his associates with breach of their
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Abdul-Jabbar
claimed, for example, that Collins often entered into deals on his behalf without a thorough
explanation of the risks. Additionally, Collins allegedly arranged bank loans for several inves-'
tors, including other athletes, by exposing Abdul-Jabbar personally for liability on the full
amount of the loans-$7.4 million-rather than on Abdul-Jabbar's $1.6 million pro rata share
without Abdul-Jabbar's knowledge. Papenek, A Lot of Hurt: Inaction Got Kareem Creamed,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 89. For other accounts of athletes losing money entrusted
to their agents, see Keteyian, 'At Times You Flat Cry', SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at
90; Nack, Thrown For Heavy Losses, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 24, 1986, at 40; Looney,
Thrown for Some Big Losses, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 12, 1985, at 22; USA Today, June 22,
1987, at C9, col. 1.
37. Sobel, supra note 13, at 710. In his book, An Athlete's Guide to Agents, attorney Rob-
ert Ruxin gives this account of an example of overcharging a client:
A few years ago an NFL rookie signed a $25,000 contract for two years with a $10,000
bonus. "That's a total of $60,000 and the agent took his 10 percent, $6,000, right off
the top," the president of the NFL Players Association told a reporter. "Well, the kid
didn't make the team, so all he got to keep was the $4,000 left over from his bonus
and the agent got to keep the $6,000. That isn't fair."
R. RuxlN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO AGENTS 57 (1982).
38. Sobel, supra note 13, at 710. For examples of conflicts of interest involving sports
agents, see Neff, supra note 2, at 83-85.
39. Sobel, supra note 13, at 710.
40. See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
42. Neff, In Hot and Heavy Pursuit, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 84 (describing
the aggressive tactics employed by sports agents as they pursue potential clients).
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The solicitation of clients begins early. Often agents start contacting
athletes prior to or during their sophomore year of college. 43 An ath-
lete projected to be an early round NFL draft selection can expect to
be contacted by literally hundreds of agents. George Rogers, who won
the Heisman Trophy during his senior season at the University of
South Carolina, estimated that 300 agents offered to represent him. 4
Another Heisman Trophy recipient, Mike Rozier, who played at the
University of Nebraska, estimated he received 'almost 1,200 letters,
most of which came from people that I had never heard of, and who
did not even know me, or want to know me. All they wanted was to
line their pockets with the money that I soon would earn in profes-
sional football." 45
But an athlete does not have to win the Heisman Trophy-symbolic
of the year's most outstanding collegiate football player in the coun-
try-to attract interest from agents. Even average players, those who
quite obviously will be middle to late round draft choices or free
agents, are courted by dozens of agents. 46
The pursuit of the college athlete is intense. Initially, there are let-
ters, cards, brochures, telephone calls, and late-night uninvited visits
to the athlete's college residence. Some agents pay college coaches to
"deliver" clients47 while others hire full time "runners" or recruiters
to make the chase. Apparently, there is nothing some agents would
not do to induce a client: they give jobs to family members; 41 they stir
rumors about rival agents and cast doubt about their credibility and
competence; 49 and they make promises-"I can make you more
money"; "I'll take care of your family"; "I'll fly you and your girl-
friend to the Coast." 50 Some even offer to provide sexual favors."
43. Id.
44. NAT'L. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, A CAREER IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: GUIDELINES
THAT MAKE DOLLARS AND SENSE 4 (1984) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
45. Id. at 6 (quoting Mike Rozier).
46. Neff, supra note 42.
47. A newspaper investigation of Lance Luchnick, a Houston-based agent, uncovered that
Luchnick paid basketball coaches amounts ranging from $100 to $14,269 for helping Luchnick
recruit their players. Newsday, April 3, 1988, at 5, 19. In one case, the newspaper reported that
Luchnick charged a client a 10% commission for negotiating a professional basketball contract
and, in turn, paid the client's high school coach a 3% commission for helping Luchnick recruit
the athlete. Id. at 19. The newspaper also reported that Luchnick gave a college player at least
$6,000 in cash and gifts in a successful effort to induce him as a client. Newsday, April 4, 1988,
at 79. See also Neff, supra note 2, at 86.
48. One agent hired the brother of a star college football player as a "special assistant" at
an annual salary of $39,000. Leiber, A Sad Goodbye to Columbus, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug.
3, 1987, at 38.
49. Neff, supra note 42, at 84.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 85.
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Then there is the money: An estimated fifty percent of the top foot-
ball and basketball talent available for the annual professional drafts
receive some sort of payment or favor from agents before the expira-
tion of their collegiate eligibility.52 Such payments are strictly prohib-
ited by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),53 the
private governing body of major college athletics.5 4 The NCAA also
prohibits its athletes from signing an agency contract or agreeing to be
represented by an agent before the end of their college eligibility.55
However, it is estimated that thirty to seventy percent of the "highest
draft picks" in football and basketball sign a contract with an agent
or agree to be represented by an agent before the end of their college
career.5 6 Most of these athletes are "presumed to accept cash or other
inducements" to sign.57
Evidently, NCAA rules do not deter the unscrupulous agent. The
accounts of illicit payments and inducements are myriad; below are
some samples:
52. Neff, Agents of Turmoil, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 3, 1987, at 34, 36. Estimates vary
widely on the percentage of collegiate athletes who agree to be represented by an agent and/or
accept money from an agent before the expiration of their eligibility. One former agent esti-
mated that 20% to 80% of the top 330 senior college football players in 1987 accepted payments
from agents while in school. USA Today, Dec. 17, 1987, at Cl, col. 4. Another former sports
agent claims that, while he was in the business, 60% of the players drafted in the first three
rounds of the NFL draft had "made a commitment, in one form or another, to an agent before
their season ended." M. TROPE, NECESSARY ROUGHNESS 77 (1987).
53. NCAA Bylaws §§ 12.01.1, 12.1.1 (a)-(f), reprinted in PROPOSED 1989-90 NATIONAL COL-
LEGIATE ATHLETiC ASSOCIATION MANUAL 57-58 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. This document
was adopted as the official NCAA Manual at the annual meeting of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association on January 9-12, 1989.
The [NCAA Manual] has been revised extensively in an effort to make NCAA regula-
tions more readily accessible and more easily understood by those responsible for their
application....
Along with major restructuring of the content, there has been considerable rewriting
of many sections of the Manual. Extreme care has been taken to avoid changing the
meaning of legislation ....
Memorandum from Richard D. Schultz, NCAA Executive Director to Chief Executive Officers,
Faculty Athletics Representatives, Directors of Athletics and Senior Women Administrators, of
NCAA Member Institutions (Nov. 21, 1988) (subject: Revised NCAA Manual). The NCAA
Manual contains a User's Guide to explain the changes made in the new edition. Id. Addition-
ally, it includes section-by-section cross references to the 1988-1989 manual to facilitate compari-
son and research.
54. The NCAA is a voluntary association of approximately 1,000 members which includes
almost all of the major universities and colleges in the United States. NCAA News, Sept. 2,
1987, at 1, col. 3. See generally NCAA CONST. arts. 1, 3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 53, at 1, 7-15. For a comprehensive analysis of the NCAA's authority and the deficiencies
inherent in the Association's regulations, see Note, Judicial Review of Disputes Between Athletes
and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 24 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1972).
55. NCAA Bylaws §§ 12.3.1, .2, .3, .4(a)-(c), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 53,
at 61-62.
56. Neff, supra note 42, at 85.
57. Id.
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-Tim McGee, a wide receiver in the National Football League,
claims that agents offered him a Mercedes-Benz automobile and a
house for his mother while he was a student at the University of
Tennessee . 8 "If you're a top-notch player, it's automatic that you're
going to be offered money by agents to sign with them," McGee
said.5 9
-George Rogers claimed that one agent who attempted to sign
him before the conclusion of his senior season offered him one-third
of the agent's corporation. 6°
-Michael Brooks, a former linebacker at Louisiana State
University, claims he was offered $65,000 to sign with an agent. "He
had [the money] in his briefcase, and he showed it to me. It was in
$100 dollar bills," Brooks said. "A lot of [agents] said if I signed
early, they'd put the contract in a safe-deposit box and they wouldn't
tell anybody about it."' 6 Brooks claimed he declined those offers
along with invitations from agents who offered to fly him, all
expenses paid, to New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Dallas, and
Houston .62
B. The Heartbreak of Overzealousness
While sordid dealings between athletes and sports agents have been
commonplace for several years, the far-reaching implications of these
acts were not realized publicly until 1987, when three agents sent
shock waves through the sporting world with revelations of wide-
spread payoffs to college athletes. 63 Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom,
operating as World Sports & Entertainment, Inc., and Jim Abernethy,
an Atlanta-based agent, became the main players in a bizarre tale of
excess and greed. In all, Walters and Bloom doled out $800,000 to
sign at least forty-four athletes, including five who were selected in the
first round of the 1987 NFL draft.M Of those who signed, seven were
declared ineligible for all or part of their senior seasons because they
signed with Walters and Bloom before their collegiate eligibility had
58. Id. at 84-85..
59. Id. at 84. McGee admitted that he accepted $3,500 from agent Norby Walters while he
was still eligible to compete for the University of Tennessee. Id. at 85.
60. GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 4.
61. Neff, supra note 42, at 85.
62. Id.
63. For an itemized and comprehensive review of the turmoil caused by sports agents in
1987, see Atlanta J. and Const., Dec. 27, 1987, at 21D, col. 1.
64. Selcraig, The Deal Went Sour, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 15, 1988, at 32.
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expired. 6 Abernethy, who had publicly berated Walters and Bloom
for their actions, later admitted he utilized the same tactics to lure
clients. Five athletes who dealt with Abernethy lost their collegiate eli-
gibility. 66
But lost college careers was just the beginning. Below are some ex-
amples.
-For the first time a university was held accountable for the
actions of its athletes with agents. The University of Alabama was
forced to return $253,447 to the NCAA, money the school had
earned participating in the association's 1987 championship
basketball tournament, because two of its players, Derrick McKey
65. Atlanta J. and Const., Dec. 27, 1987, at 26D, col. 1. While there is proof that only 30
athletes received money from Walters and Bloom before the conclusion of their collegiate eligi-
bilities, a total of 52 athletes have been identified as having contact with Walters and/or Bloom
while in college. A vast majority of the athletes were not exposed until after the conclusion of
their college careers and thus escaped NCAA sanctions. Id.
However, revelations subsequent to the expiration of some athletes' collegiate careers have led
to other measures. For example, Paul Palmer, a running back and kick-return specialist for the
Kansas City Chiefs, admitted that he accepted a $5,000 loan and monthly cash payments from
Walters and Bloom in 1986 during his final season at Temple University. Orlando Sentinel, July
26, 1988, at D-2, col. 3. Palmer earned All-America honors and finished second in the voting for
the Heisman Trophy in 1986 in leading the Owls to a 6-5 record.
In 1988, two years after leaving Temple, Palmer admitted that he accepted the money from
the sports agents. Telephone interview with Mike Kaine, Associate Sports Information Dir.,
Temple University (Aug. 1, 1988). Temple University officials reacted swiftly to the confession
by voluntarily forfeiting all six victories from the 1986 season. Additionally, the school erased
Palmer's statistics from that season. The school's action excised several individual game, season,
and career records Palmer had amassed during a four-year Temple career, which unquestionably
was tarnished by his subsequent revelations. Id.
But that did not end the anguish for Palmer. It was also discovered that he was defrauded of
nearly one third of his $450,000 signing bonus by Bloom. Selcraig, The Deal Went Sour, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1988, at 32-33. Bloom persuaded Palmer to invest the amount in a "credit
repair" business. Id. at 33. However, Bloom instead used the money to cover personal expenses
including the leasing of a $160,000 Rolls-Royce, paying off a $6,958 clothing bill, credit card
bills, and his ex-wife's rent. Id.
66. Atlanta J. and Const., Dec. 27, 1987, at 21D, col. 1; id. at 26D, col. 5. Abernethy
claimed that he spent $500,000 during a 12-month spree of recruiting potential clients. USA
Today, Dec. 17, 1987, at C-I, col. 4. Additionally he claimed that he spoke to between 200 and
250 athletes and that each was willing to accept money from him or were already being paid by
another agent. Said Abernethy: "Everyone is being paid and signed. If anyone says otherwise,
they're really stupid, blind or they're lying." Id.
During a short-lived career as a player agent, Abernethy instituted a unique system of com-
pensating athletes. He provided bonuses linked to performance and holidays. The amounts var-
ied from $75 to $1,100. For example, Abernethy's agency contract with Memphis State
University basketball player Sylvester Gray stipulated that he would receive, in addition to $500
per month, a $1,000 Christmas bonus and a $200 Thanksgiving bonus. Abernethy agreed to pay
Texas Christian running back Wayne Waddy $75 for each touchdown he scored. USA Today,
Dec. 16, 1987, at 9-C, col. 2.
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and Terry Coner, had signed early with Walters and Bloom.67 During
McKey's junior season, 1986-1987, when he was named the
Southeastern Conference Player of the Year, McKey accepted $2,000
from the two and signed an agreement to accept $300 a month and
an automobile. 68
-Athletes were faced with the realities and the accountabilities of
their actions. More than sixty were subpoenaed before a federal
grand jury in Chicago and faced the possibility of being indicted on
fraud and tax-evasion charges. 69
67. Atlanta Const., May 10, 1988, at IE, col. 2. The basis for the penalty was set forth in a
December 16, 1987 letter from Richard D. Schultz, the Executive Director of the NCAA, to
Thomas L. Jones, Professor of Law at the University of Alabama, the contents of which are set
forth below:
This is to advise you that the NCAA Executive Committee, on its December 14
telephone conference, denied the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa's, appeal of the
application of Executive Regulation 1-3-j) to the participation of two ineligible stu-
dent-athletes representing the institution in the 1987 NCAA Division I Men's Basket-
ball Championship.
Executive Regulation 1-3-0) states in part that "When an ineligible student-athlete
participates in an NCAA championship and the student-athlete or the instutition knew
or had reason to know of the ineligibility, . . . 90 percent of the institution's share of
net receipts from such competition in excess of the regular expense reimbursement
shall be withheld by the NCAA executive director .. " Based on the information
presented in the appeal, the Executive Committee determined that the two involved
student-athletes knew or had reason to know of their ineligibility.
Accordingly, 90 percent of the institution's share of net receipts from the champi-
onship will be withheld. This calculation will be based on the Southeastern Confer-
ence's formula for distributing such receipts among its member institutions and
amounts to $253,447 (50 percent of the total share of $633,616, minus the 10 percent
previously sent to Alabama).
In addition, the Executive Committee affirmed the application of Executive Regula-
tion l-4-(f), which states in part that "When a student-athlete representing the institu-
tion in a team championship is declared ineligible subsequent to the tournament,...
the record of the team's performance shall be deleted, the team's place in the final
standings shall be vacated, and the team's trophy and the ineligible student-athletes'
awards shall be returned to the Association." We would appreciate your forwarding
the ineligible student-athletes' watches to the attention of Dennis L. Poppe of this
office.
Although it could not determine with certainty that the institution knew or should
have known of the student-athletes' involvement with professional sports agents, the
Executive Committee expressed considerable concern that the university did not ap-
pear to have made sufficient effort to advise the athletes regarding the ramifications
of such involvement or, subsequently, to fully ascertain the facts of the situta-
tion ....
68. Neff, supra note 52, at 36.
69. Atlanta J. and Const., Dec. 27, 1987, at 21D, col. 1. The fraud charges stemmed from
the fact that the athletes, once they had signed with Walters and Bloom, defrauded their schools
by later signing standard documents claiming they had not been involved in any behavior that
would jeopardize their collegiate eligibility. Neff, supra note 52, at 35. Facing potential indict-
ments for racketeering, mail fraud, and obstruction of justice, 43 former college players agreed
to enter a pre-trial diversion program. The 43 violated NCAA regulations when they dealt with
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-Former Ohio State University wide receiver Cris Carter was
indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of mail fraud and one
count of obstruction of justice for his association with Walters and
Bloom. 70 Carter, who now plays for the Philadelphia Eagles, faces
ten years in prison and a $500,000 fine. 71
-Agents, too, were held accountable for their actions. Walters
and Bloom were indicted by a federal grand jury in Chicago on
charges which include racketeering, conspiracy to commit extortion
and mail fraud. 72 The eight count, eighty-five page indictment
culminated a seventeen month investigation 73 which uncovered that
Walters and Bloom had signed forty-four athletes to professional
contracts before their collegiate eligibilities had expired. 74 The
"indictment alleges that Walters and Bloom offered players clothing,
concert and airline tickets, automobiles, cash, interest-free loans,
hotel accomodations, use of limousines, insurance policies, trips to
entertainment events, introductions to celebrities, and cash to their
families, in exchange for the athletes' signatures on contracts.
75
Additionally, the indictments connected Walters and Bloom to a
reputed mobster and alleged that the pair had threatened physical
harm to four former clients who later signed contracts with other
agents.7 6 The two each face a maximum seventy years in prison, $2
million in fines and forfeiture of their sports business if convicted.
7
-Walters and Bloom also were indicted in Alabama on charges of
violating the state's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, commercial
bribery, and tampering with a sports event for their involvement with
Walters and Bloom during the football seasons of 1985, 1986 and/or 1987. Atlanta Const., Aug.
25, 1988, at IA, col. 4; id. at 21A, col. 1. The athletes also agreed to repay their former schools
the monetary equivalent of their athletic scholarships and to provide between 100 and 250 hours
of community service during a one-year probation period. Id. Finally, the athletes agreed to
testify in the government's case against Walters and Bloom. Id. However, the athletes were not
rendered immune from possible action by the Internal Revenue Service for failure to report the
cash and gifts received from Walters and Bloom. Id.
70. Atlanta Const., Aug. 25, 1988, at IA, col. 5.
71. Id. at 21A.
72. Selcraig, The Deal Went Sour, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1988, at 32.
73. Id. The investigation was sparked when athlete agent Kathie Clements was slashed and
beaten in her Skokie, Illinois office by a man wearing a ski mask and gloves. Neff, supra note
52, at 34. Chicago detectives termed the incident a "message beating." Atlanta J. and Const.,
Dec. 27, 1987, at 21D, col. I & 26D, col. 2. Clements, an associate of a Chicago sports agent,
earlier had been scolded on the telephone by Walters and Bloom because the agency she worked
for had signed three of the pair's former clients. Neff, supra note 52, at 34. Additionally, former
Auburn University running back Brent Fullwood told the Chicago grand jury investigating Wal-
ters and Bloom that Bloom threatened to "bump off" his agent, George Kickliter. Id. at 35-36.
74. Selcraig, supra note 72, at 32.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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McKey and Coner.8
-Abernethy, indicted in Alabama under the same charges as
Walters and Bloom for his dealings with Auburn University football
player Kevin Porter, was convicted by a jury of tampering with a
sports event.7 9 He was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $2,000
on the misdemeanor conviction .1
78. USA Today, Feb. 2, 1988, at 11C, col. 1. In a 12-count indictment, Alabama charged
Walters, Bloom, and Walters' company, World Sports Entertainment, Inc., with violating sec-
tions 8-19-5, 13A-11-120, and 13A-11-143 of the Code of Alabama. Alabama v. Walters, G. J.
No. 2779, Tuscaloosa County, Ala., Jan. Term, 1988. The charges, violation of the state's De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act, commercial bribery, and tampering with a sports contest, carry a
maximum six-year jail term and up to $12,000 in fines. Atlanta Const., May 9, 1988, at ID,
col. 5.
In a settlement worked out with the state on May 2, 1988, Bloom pleaded guilty to one count
of deceptive trade practice and agreed to testify in the state's case against Walters. The agree-
ment included the stipulation that, if Walters was convicted, Bloom would wash state police cars
nine hours a day for one week. During that week, Bloom could lodge at the Tuscaloosa, Ala-
bama, hotel of his choice. Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 9, 1988, at 13.
Bloom never had to wash any police cars, however, as Walters was not tried on the charges.
Instead, Walters settled the matter by agreeing to pay $200,000 in damages to the University of
Alabama as partial reimbursement for the money the school was forced to return to the NCAA
for using two ineligible players, Derrick McKey and Terry Coner, during the 1987 NCAA bas-
ketball championship. Atlanta Const., May 10, 1988, at IE, col. 2. See supra note 67 and ac-
companying text. In return for the $200,000 payment, the state dropped its criminal charges
against Walters. Walters also agreed never to conceal any other dealings which may have oc-
curred between him and any other athlete from the Southeastern Conference. USA Today, Feb.
3, 1988, at lIC, col. 1.
The settlement of the criminal charges also put to rest a pending civil action against Walters
filed by the University of Alabama. In the suit filed in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County,
Alabama, on May 11, 1988, the school suea Walters and his company for $3,000,000 claiming
past, future and punitive damages. Civ. No. 83-372, Tuscaloosa County, Ala., filed May 11,
1988 [hereinafter Civil Action]. The suit charged that Walters and his associates "intentionally
interfered with the contractual relationship" between the University and the players. Id. at 7.
The contractual relationship referred to the scholarships signed by the athletes with the Univer-
stiy. Athletic scholarships entered into between student and school have been held to create a
contractual obligation between the parties. See, e.g., Begley v. Corporation of Mercer Univ., 367
F. Supp. 908, 909 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 192 S.E.2d 197 (1972).
The complaint prayed for future damages and past damages. The past damages included the
$253,447 the University was forced to return to the NCAA. Future damages included money the
school claims it may have earned if Derrick McKey had been eligible to compete for the Univer-
sity during the 1987-1988 collegiate basketball season. Civil Action at 7.
79. Montgomery Advertiser, March 2, 1988, at IA, col. 5. Abernethy was found innocent
on charges of commerical bribery and violation of deceptive trade law. Id.
80. Id. Abernethy's conviction was later reversed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Ap-
peals. Abernethy v. State, No. 413, slip op. (Ala. Crim. App., 5th Div. 1988). The court found
that Abernethy lacked the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of tampering with a sports
event under Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-11-143. Id., slip op. at 4-5. The court stated:
In the context of this case, a violation of the N.C.A.A. rules and regulations does not
constitute the criminal offense of tampering with a sports contest unless that violation
was done "with the intent to influence the outcome of a sports contest." Mere tam-
pering with a player's eligibility in violation of N.C.A.A. rules is not a criminal of-
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-Walters and Bloom, in turn, attempted to utilize the courts and
other judicial bodies to retrieve money they claim was owed to them
by athletes who originally signed contracts with them but later
switched to other agents.8 '
fense unless done with the specific intent to influence the outcome of a sports contest.
Id., slip op. at 6-7. "The fundamental reason why Abernethy's conviction must be reversed is
because the crime of tampering with a sports contest was obviously not intended to and does
not, embrace the agent contract type of situation involved in this case." Id., slip op. at 12.
The office of the Attorney General of Alabama filed an application for rehearing with the
Court of Criminal Appeals on January 13, 1989. Application for Rehearing, Abernethy v. State,
(Ala. Crim. App., 5th Div. 1989) (No. 413).
81. Atlanta J. and Const., Dec. 27, 1987, at 26D, col. 1. Thus far, Walters and Bloom have
been unsuccessful in claims against former clients. In one action filed in a New York federal
district court, the two sued Brent Fullwood, formerly a runningback at Auburn University,
claiming Fullwood breached his agency contract. Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). Fullwood had agreed to be represented by Walters and Bloom and signed a
$4,000 promissory note with the two on August 20, 1986, just weeks before the start of his final
season at Auburn. Id. at 157. However, just prior to being selected in the first round of the 1987
National Football League draft, Fullwood hired a different agent to represent him, thus prompt-
ing the lawsuit. Id.
The court examined the alleged agreement between Walters and Fullwood and determined that
"[t]here is a powerful inference that the agreement was actually signed before or during the
college football season . . . and unethically postdated." Id. Stating that the parties had full
knowledge that the agreement "was fraudulent and wrong," the court dismissed Walters' claim.
Id. at 163-64. The court wrote, "We decline to serve as 'paymaster of the wages of crime, or
referee between thieves.'" Id. at 160 (quoting Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 271, 82 N.E.2d
571, 572 (1948)).
In another action against a former client, Walters and Bloom attempted to collect more than
$54,000 which they had paid to University of Iowa running back Ronnie Harmon, his girlfriend
and members of his family. Bloom v. Harmon, No. 11059-014 (1987) (Culver, Arb.). Prior to his
senior season at Iowa, Harmon entered into an agency agreement with World Sports Entertain-
ment, Inc. (WSE), Walters' company, and signed a promissory note for $2,500. Id. at 2-4. The
parties also agreed that WSE would pay Harmon at least $250 per month until he negotiated a
professional sports contract. Id. at 4. In addition to cash payments, WSE provided Harmon, his
girlfriend, and family members other gifts including more than $32,000 as a downpayment on a
Mercedes-Benz automobile, plane tickets, and concert tickets. Id. at 5. Finally, WSE paid Har-
mon $1,500 for revealing the telephone number of one of his collegiate teammates. Id. Harmon
subsequently was drafted in the first round of the 1987 NFL draft by the Buffalo Bills. Bloom
began negotiations with the Bills on Harmon's behalf, but was fired by Harmon before an agree-
ment was reached. Id. at 5-7.
WSE filed a grievance against Harmon with the National Football League Players Association
(NFLPA), requesting repayment for its work in Harmon's contract negotiations. Further, WSE
sought reimbursement for more than $54,000 which it had given Harmon and his family. In
conjunction with the NFLPA grievance, WSE filed a civil action against Harmon in the New
York Supreme Court seeking similar relief. The New York court ordered the action stayed pend-
ing the outcome of the NFLPA arbitration. Id. at 9.
Arbitrator John C. Culver ruled that Harmon was obligated to pay WSE for the services it
rendered on Harmon's behalf and the $2,500 promissory note. Id. at 25-29. However, Culver
ruled that the other cash and gifts did not have to be repaid as there was no credible evidence of
any obligation owed by Harmon. Id. at 26. The arbitrator opined:
[I n the absence of any written documents or other reliable evidence establishing that
these payments were loans, the Arbitrator will not order Mr. Harmon to repay
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-Faced with a threatened lawsuit by the Big Ten Athletic
Conference, Walters and Bloom agreed never to approach an athlete
from that conference in the future.8 2 Additionally, the two turned
over to conference officials all information they possessed on past or
current Big Ten athletes. 3
III. REGULATION OF THE ATHLETE AGENT
Norby Walters, Lloyd Bloom, and Jim Abernethy were not the first
agents to offer inducements to college athletes; nor were they the first
to sign athletes early. However, the subsequent course of events sur-
rounding the three were novel to collegiate athletics and prompted a
wholesale review of existing regulations and a rash of new legislation
focusing on the third party victims of agent-athlete indiscretions.
A. The Law Before Walters, Bloom & Abernethy
The initial approach to sports agent legislation smothered the agent
with regulations, red tape, and restrictions. 84 These laws generally are
them.... If WSE intended these items to be loans, it had the burden of establishing
clear and formal agreements outlining the reciprocal obligations of the parties.
Id. at 26-27.
The Arbitrator further noted that WSE may have considered the advances to Harmon as "an
investment in [Harmon] and in its fledgling sports representation business." Id. at 27. The arbi-
trator wrote, "WSE may have invested this money in Mr. Harmon with the hopes that it would
'pay off' in endorsements for Mr. Harmon, on which WSE would earn substantial commissions,
and with the promise of attracting other players to represent in years to come." Id. at 28.
However, while the arbitrator freed Harmon of a substantial financial burden, he did not
exonerate Harmon for his dealings with the agents:
It should be emphasized that the Arbitrator does not wish to excuplate Mr. Harmon
from the role he played in this distasteful case. Indeed, Mr. Harmon knew or should
have known that his acceptance of these payments was wrong; it compromised his
integrity and jeopardized his relationship with the NCAA and his university. Mr. Har-
mon admitted that he affirmatively requested money from WSE on several occasions.
Although the Arbitrator finds that Mr. Harmon has no obligation under the NFLPA
Regulations to repay this money, because there was no agreement to do so, he will
not, of course, be relieved of the incalculable cost of his conduct in personal terms.
The Arbitrator also observes that there are other forums in which the consequences of
Mr. Harmon's activities may be addressed.
Id. at 28-29.
82. Atlanta J. and Const., Dec. 27, 1987, at 26D, col. 1.
83. Id.
84. States that utilize this approach are Alabama, California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas. These states were the first five to pass legislation aimed directly at sports agents. Four
states, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, and Mississippi subsequently passed similar legislation. See
infra note 85. For an extensive account and explanation of the law in Alabama, California,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, along with non-statutory regulations which affect agents, see
Sobel, supra note 13, at 724-80; Kohn, supra note 14, at 11-13.
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characterized by extensive registration requirements,85 which most of-
ten include a lengthy application form accompanied by a fee ranging
from the nominal to the excessive.8 6 The registration often requires
annual renewals.87 The application is reviewable by either a commis-
sion or the secretary of state,88 and the license is revocable by those
authorities if an agent commits a violation of the law. 89 Additionally,
these laws require the posting of a surety bond ranging from $25,000
to $100,000. 90 The agent must file a schedule of fees to be charged9'
85. Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-4, -5 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1511
(West Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-4A-4, -5 (1988); Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988,
H.F. 2432, § 9A.3.1, .2, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 556 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE §
9A.3.1, .2); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:422(C) (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN.
CODE art. 56, § 633(b) (Supp. 1988); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-5(1) (Supp. 1988);
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62.C (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
86. Application fees range from $50 in Mississippi to $1,000 in Oklahoma, with others to be
set by administrative action. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-12 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1517 (West Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-12 (1988); Iowa: Act of May
14, 1988, H.F. 2432, § 9A.3.4(a), 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 556 (West) (to be codified at IowA
CODE § 9A.3.4); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:422(E) (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN.
CODE art. 56, § 633(f) (Supp. 1988); Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-5(3) (Supp. 1988);
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62.E (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
87. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-9 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1515 (West
Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-9 (1988); Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988, H.F. 2432,
§ 9A.3.3, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 556 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.3.3); Louisiana:
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:422(D) (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 633(E)
(Supp. 1988); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-5(2) (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62.D (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, §§
2(d), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
88. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-6 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1512 (West
Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-4A-6, -7 (1988); Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988, H.F.
2432, § 5, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 557 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.4); Mississippi:
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-7(1) (Supp. 1988).
89. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-8 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1527 (West
Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-8 (1988); Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988, H.F. 2432,
§ 9A.5, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 557 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.4); Louisiana: LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:422(F) (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 634 (Supp.
1988); Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-7(2) (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 821.62.1 (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 3 (Vernon
Supp. 1988).
90. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-14 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1519(a)
(West Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-13 (1988); Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988,
H.F. 2432, § 6.1, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 537 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.5.1);
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-9 (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
821.62.G (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(h) (Vernon Supp.
1988).
91. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-24 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1531(a)
(West Supp. 1988); Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988, H.F. 2432, § 7.3, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 558
(West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.5A.3); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:423 (C)
(West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 635(a) (2) (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA.
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and must have the proposed contract approved by the appropriate au-
thority.9 2 The agent also is required to retain specific records of all
transactions with and for the athlete. 93
These laws generally prohibit both solicitation9 and the signing of
an athlete to a representation agreement before the athlete's collegiate
eligibility has expired. 95 Also, these laws uniformly provide both crim-
inal and civil penalties for violators. 96
While these attempts to regulate the athlete agent are meritorious,
they have proved to be ineffective. Many agents circumvent the laws
by avoiding contacts within the state;97 others simply ignore the rules'
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.63 (C) (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8871, § 5(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
92. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-22 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1530 (West
Supp. 1988); Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988, H.F. 2432, § 7.1, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 557 (West) (to
be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.5A.1); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:423(A) (West 1987);
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 635(a) (1) (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, § 821.63(A) (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 5(a), (c)
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
93. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-26 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 1532 (West
Supp. 1988); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:427 (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE
art. 56, § 638 (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.67 (West Supp. 1988);
Texas: TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
94. Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.080(1) (Michie Supp. 1988); Maryland: MD.
ANN. CODE art. 56, § 636(b)(5)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
821.64(8) (West Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 6(b)(5) (Vernon
Supp. 1988).
95. Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988, H.F. 2432, § 8.2.3-.5, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 558 (West)
(to be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.6.3-.5); Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 518.080(1) (Michie
Supp. 1988); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:424(8) (West 1987); Michigan: Mich. H.B.
4634, § l(1)(a) (1988) (Proposed MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.411e(l)(a) (approved Dec. 27, 1988)).
Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-11 (g) (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 821.64.8 (West Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania: Pa. H.B. 1879, § l(a)(1) (1988) (proposed 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107(a)(1) (approved Dec. 21, 1988)); Texas: TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8871, § 6(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
96. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-41 (Supp. 1987); California: CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1541,
1547 (West Supp. 1988); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-16(c) (1988); Iowa: Act of May 14,
1988, H.F. 2432, § 11, 1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 558-59 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE §
9A.8); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.080(2) (Michie Supp. 1988); Louisiana: LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 4:426 (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 639 (Supp. 1988); Michi-
gan: Mich. H.B. 4634, § 1(2) (1988) (proposed MICH. Comrn. LAWS § 750.41 le(2) (approved Dec.
27, 1988)); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-15 (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 821.66 (West Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania: Pa. H.B. 1879, § l(b) (1988) (proposed
18 PA. CONST.-STAT. ANN. § 7107(b) (approved Dec. 21, 1988)); Texas: TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8871, §§ 8, 9 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
While Mississippi generally follows the older pattern of regulation, it provides for substanital
recovery of damages from both the agent and the athlete in the case where an athlete loses his
eligibility because of his contact with a sports agent. Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-23 (Supp. 1988).
The school may recover the price of the athlete's scholarship and other damages, including lost
revenues, suffered as a direct result of the athlete's loss of eligibility. Id.
97. Hochberg, The State of Agent Legislation, SPORTS INC., May 30, 1988, at 42-43. Okla-
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existence. 98 Enforcement has been difficult, if not impossible, because
often the only parties with knowledge of the agent's dealings are the
agent and the athlete recruited. Neither party, obviously, has an in-
centive to notify state authorities that the agent and/or the athlete
have violated state law-that is, as long as the athlete and the agent
are satisfied with the relationship. 99
B. A New Approach to Agent Regulation
Widespread revelations of payoffs and inducements by agedis to
college athletes put college administrators and state legislators on no-
tice that existing state regulations were an insufficient deterrent to ag-
gressive sports agents. The actions of bad agents prompted states
which considered adopting legislation to reconsider the thrust of the
regulations. In 1988, six states, including Florida, 100 abandoned or
modified the onerous registration requirements characteristic in some
states'01 and shifted their attention toward more practical legislation.
1. Georgia
Georgia takes a dual approach toward regulating sports agents. The
state adopted the comprehensive registration requirements characteris-
tic of early state legislation, yet also addressed more present concerns
by requiring notice of an agency contract prior to its execution.
An agent who intends to sign a Georgia collegian to an agency
agreement prior to the expiration of the athlete's eligibility must no-
tify the Georgia Athlete Agent Regulatory Commission in writing. 10
The commission, in turn, will notify the athlete's school of the pend-
ing agreement. 01 Finally, thirty days after the commission receives no-
tice from the agent, the agent may sign the athlete to a valid agency
agreement. 104
homa State Senator Norman Lamb, Repub., Enid, sponsor of Oklahoma's agent legislation, has
stated that agents who do not live in Oklahoma "'don't pay any attention"' to the law. Id. at
43 (quoting Sen. Lamb).
98. For example, California has had a registration requirement since 1981 for all agents
who do business in the state. As of early 1988, only 17 agents had registered. Kohn, supra note
14, at 11. Other states with agent registration requirements have similar compliance results. Id.
at 12. See also Roberts, Protecting the College Athlete from Unscrupulous Agents, SPORTS
LAW., Fall 1987, at 8-9.
99. See, e.g., Neff, supra note 52, at 42.
100. Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio and Tennessee, as well as Florida, have adopted legislation
that eliminates registration almost entirely. Georgia's legislation combines the older requirements
with the new approach. See infra notes 102-223 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
102. GA. COVE ANN. § 43-4A-16(a) (1988).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Requiring prior notice to state and school authorities before the
athlete executes the agency contract is the most significant preventa-
tive measure taken by states. However, only four states presently re-
quire prior notice. 105 In Georgia, the prior notice requirement is a two-
pronged protective mechanism for the state's colleges and universities.
First, because a warning before the execution of the agency agreement
is mandatory, the school is provided sufficient notice that one of its
athletes soon will be ineligible for intercollegiate competition. The
school can act promptly by dissuading the athlete from signing or dis-
missing the athlete from the team. Second, if the agent ignores the
notice requirement and signs the athlete, the agent risks forfeiting the
$100,000 surety bond which must be posted with the state upon regis-
tration. 106 This money is payable to the athlete's school if the secret
signing leads to sanctions against the school for using an ineligible
player. 107
105. Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-16(a) (1988); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-
4(1), (2) (Burns Supp. 1988); Minnesota: Act of April 28, 1988, ch. 701, § 1(2), 1988 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 1076 (West) (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33) (Supp. 1989); Ohio: Ohio
Subst. S.B. 263, § 1, at 2 (1988) (proposed OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4771.02(B)) (approved Mar.
14, 1988).
Three states that passed agent legislation before 1988-Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas-had
provisions which called for notification of the athlete's school. However, these states required
notice after the signing.
Louisiana was the first state to require that the contract between an agent and an athlete be
filed with the athletic director of the athlete's institution. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:423(E) (West
1987). However, Louisiana's law is quite narrow. That is, only contracts signed between an
agent and a "Louisiana non-NCAA athlete," defined in the statute as "an athlete in a team
sport who resides in this state who is not a Louisiana NCAA athlete," id. § 4:421(A)(5), must be
filed with the athletic director within five days of the signing of the contract. Therefore, athletes
at Louisiana institutions which belong to the NCAA are not covered by the filing requirement.
Additionally, Louisiana allows a non-NCAA athlete to terminate the agency agreement within 10
days of its filing with the secretary of state. Id. § 4:423(E).
Oklahoma has a similar provision, requiring notice of the signing of a non-NCAA athlete
within five days of the execution of the agency agreement. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.63.E
(West Supp. 1988). Like Louisiana, Oklahoma also allows a non-NCAA athlete to terminate his
agency agreement within 10 days of its filing with the secretary of state. Id.
Texas also requires that the agency contract be filed with the athletic director within five days
of signing. However, it does not distinguish between an NCAA and non-NCAA athlete. Texas
requires that:
if the athlete is a student at an institution of higher education located in this state, the
athlete agent must file a copy of the contract with the athletic director of the institu-
tion .... not later than the fifth day after the date on which the contract is signed by
the athlete.
TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 5(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988). A Texas athlete may cancel
the agency contract up to 15 days after execution by written notification to the athlete agent. Id.
§ 5(f).
Maryland adopted the same notice and cancellation requirements as Texas. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 56, § 635(c), (d)(l) (Supp. 1988).
106. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-4A-13, -14 (1988).
107. Id.
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However, while Georgia's attempt to compel notice may be a threat
to agents, the state's law is deficient in at least three ways. First,
Georgia does not place a corresponding burden on the student athlete
to notify the school of a pending agreement between the athlete and
an agent. This apparently frees the athlete from any liability under the
statute for breaching a scholarship commitment to the school. Sec-
ond, Georgia caps damages against the agent at $100,000. Experiences
in other states serve as evidence that damages can exceed that amount.
Finally, the failure to prescribe criminal sanctions weakens the impact
of the law.
Despite the deficiencies, one positive aspect of the notice require-
ment is that it provides the athlete a mandatory time period which
may be utilized to retain the guidance and expertise of a third party
who can review the agency agreement for fairness and enforceability.
In the past, some athletes who signed agreements while eligible for
collegiate play subsequently found themselves bound to unconsciona-
ble deals. However, because of the secret nature of these signings and
the fear of losing eligibility, the athlete rarely sought outside legal ad-
vice. This fact provided the unscrupulous agent with an advantage
over the less-knowledgeable athlete. Under Georgia's act, however,
the athlete can utilize the thirty-day waiting period to closely scruti-
nize the agency agreement.
2. Indiana
Before an agent can execute an agreement with a student athlete in
Indiana, the agent must provide written notification of the pending
agreement to the athletic director of the athlete's school.108 Proper no-
tice is required no later than ten days before the contract is to be exe-
cuted.l °9 Violation of the provision constitutes a Class D felony," 0
punishable by imprisonment for a fixed term of two years and up to a
$10,000 fine."'
The Indiana law also puts responsibility on professional sports
teams or entities. That is, if a student athlete intends to enter into an
agreement with a professional team or agrees to participate as a pro-
fessional athlete in a non-team sport, the team or entity which will
sign the athlete must give similar prior written notification to the ath-
letic director of the student athlete's institution or face a Class D fel-
ony charge. "1 2
108. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-4(1), (2) (Burns Supp. 1988).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 35-50-2-7(a).
112. Id.
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Indiana, like Georgia, does not place the same burden on its ath-
letes. However, because of the severe criminal penalties prescibed in
the act, agents may be less inclined to break the law in Indiana than in
states like Georgia where criminal sanctions are nonexistent.
3. Minnesota
Minnesota is one of seven states that specifically includes athletes
other than collegians within the scope of its legislation." 3 The state's
definition of "student athlete" includes not only current collegians
but "any individual who may be eligible to engage in collegiate sports
in the future.'1 4 Therefore, Minnesota's law covers the state's high
school athletes, including baseball players who are commonly drafted
out of high school." 5 Additionally, the state law encompasses non-
team sport athletes, such as tennis players and golfers, who frequently
turn professional without attending college.
A Minnesota athlete who chooses to sign a professional sports con-
tract and/or retain an agent before the expiration of collegiate eligibil-
ity must first file a "Waiver of Eligibility" with both the Minnesota
Secretary of State and the athletic director of the athlete's institu-
tion.1 6 The waiver is a formal revocation of the athlete's collegiate
eligibility." 7 According to the Minnesota law, the athlete must then
wait seven days after filing the waiver before entering into an agree-
ment with an agent or professional sports organization."' The waiver
113. Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi and Oklahoma are the others.
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.010(a) (Michie Supp. 1988); Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 4:421.4(5) (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 632(cX2)(ii) (Supp. 1988);
Michigan: Mich. H.B. 4634, § l(3)(g) (1988) (proposed MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.41le(3)(g)
(approved Dec. 27, 1988)); Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-1(1)(e) (Supp. 1988); Okla-
homa: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.61 .A.5 (West Supp. 1988).
114. Act of April 28, ch. 701, § 1.1(b), 1988 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1076 (West) (codified at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33. I(b) (Supp. 1989).
115. Any amateur baseball player is eligible to be drafted during Major League Baseball's
annual summer draft. In football and basketball, an athlete who has not completed collegiate
eligibility or who has not been removed from high school for four years, must apply to the
respective professional league for inclusion in its draft.
116. Act of April 28, ch. 701, § 1.2, 1988 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1076 (West) (codified at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33.2 (Supp. 1989).
117. According to Minnesota law, the waiver form must provide:
WAIVER OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ELIGIBILITY
I .... hereby waive'any and all intercollegiate athletic eligibility. This waiver is not
effective until seven days after it has been received by the Minnesota secretary of state
and the office of the athletic director.
This waiver is revocable until my intercollegiate athletic eligibility is terminated as a
result of my entering either a contract with an athletic agent or a professional sports
contract.
Id. at 1077.
118. Id. §§ 1(2), (3), at 1076-77.
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places the athlete's institution on notice that the athlete will soon be
ineligible for collegiate competition. An agent's failure to adhere to
the prescribed waiting period allows the athlete to void the contract., 19
The agent must then return to the athlete any compensation received
from the athlete for services rendered by the agent. 120
This provision should be a significant deterrent to the agent who
otherwise would choose to ignore the law and secretly enter into an
agreement with a player who has not filed a waiver of eligibility. The
agent is risking the possibility that the athlete may void the agency
contract at any time, even after the agent has negotiated the player's
professional contract, without any financial obligation to the agent.
In addition to prescribing conduct for the athlete, Minnesota law
also provides that an agent cannot sign an athlete "before the effec-
tive date of [the] student athlete's waiver of intercollegiate athletic eli-
gibility. ''121
Minnesota's law also addresses an area of concern that has been
ignored in some states-the relationship between agents and school
employees. It has long been rumored and only recently verified that
college coaches accept cash and favors to persuade an athlete to em-
ploy a specific agent.' 22 Minnesota addresses this gross conflict of in-
terest by prohibiting anyone from offering, giving, or promising an
employee of an educational institution "any benefit, reward, or con-
sideration to which the employee is not legally entitled" in return for
the employee's assistance in recruiting an athlete as a client.12 1
A violation of the Minnesota law exposes the agent to a maximum
civil penalty of $100,000 or "three times the amount given, offered,
or promised as an inducement for the student athlete to enter the
agency contract or professional sports contract."' 24
119. Id. § 1(5), at 1077.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 1(3), at 1077.
122. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
123. Act of April 28, 1988, ch. 701, § 1.4, 1988 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1077 (West) (codified
at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33.4 (Supp. 1989)). Other states that include provisions to restrict
relationships between agents and school employees are Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Iowa: Act of May 14, 1988, H.F. 2432, § 8.5,
1988 Iowa Legis. Serv. 558 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 9A.6.5); Louisiana: LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 4:424(6) (West 1987); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 636(b)(3) (Supp.
1988); Michigan: Mich. H.B. 4634, § (1)(b) (1988) (proposed MICH. CoMp. LAWS §
750.41le(1)(b) (approved Dec. 27, 1988)); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-11(f) (Supp.
1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.64(6) (West Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania: Pa.
H.B. 1879, § l(a)(3) (1988) (proposed 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107(a)(3) (approved Dec. 21,
1988)); Texas: TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 6(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
124. Act of April 28, ch. 701, § 1.3, 1988 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1077 (West) (codified at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33.3 (Supp. 1989)).
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4. Ohio
An agent must satisfy two prerequisites before signing an Ohio col-
legian to a contract. 25 First, the agent must prepare an integrated
written contract. 26 Second, the agent must file a copy of that contract
with the athletic director of the athlete's school no later than fourteen
days prior to the execution of the contract. 127 Failure to adhere to
these two steps renders the agency contract unenforceable. 128
Ohio's law allows the state attorney general to obtain an injunction
against an agent if the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe
that the agent is not complying with the fourteen-day notice require-
ment.'29 The attorney general may seek a temporary restraining order
or an injunction "to restrain and prevent the violation."' 130 The court
may issue the order or injunction upon a showing "by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the athlete agent has violated or is violating"
the notice requirement. 3 '
Additionally, Ohio is the only state that incorporates a long-arm
statute into its act. 3 2 Specifically, the state's law allows an Ohio court
to "exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident agent as to a
cause of action arising from the agent entering into a contract with an
Ohio collegian when the athlete is outside the state." 33
This long-arm provision is significant because it allows Ohio to pur-
sue criminal action 134 against agents who attempt to circumvent the
state's legislation by secretly signing the athlete while the athlete is
outside the state. Though there is little substantive proof of these sign-
ings, it is a logical belief that some agents avoid state regulations by
paying expenses for athletes to visit the agent's office outside the
state. Additionally, some agents solicit athletes while the athletes are
travelling outside of the state for competition or vacation.
5. Tennessee
In Tennessee, a contractual relationship' entered into between a
student athlete and an agent is not valid or enforceable until notice of
125. Ohio Subst. S.B. 263, § 1, at 2 (1988) (proposed OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.02
(approved Mar. 14, 1988)).
126. Id. (proposed OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.02(A) (approved Mar. 14, 1988)).
127. Id. (proposed OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.02(B) (approved Mar. 14, 1988)).
128. Id. (proposed OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.04 (approved Mar. 14, 1988)).
129. Id. (proposed Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.05 (approved Mar. 14, 1988)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (proposed OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.06 (approved Mar. 14, 1988)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (proposed OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.99 (approved Mar. 14, 1988)).
135. Tennessee's definition of a "contractual relationship" is broad. The state defines at
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the contract is received by the "chief executive officer" of the ath-
lete's school. 3 6 Such notice must be given to the school by both the
athlete and the agent within seventy-two hours of the execution of the
agreement. 13 7
Additionally, an athlete has the right to rescind the agreement,
which must be in writing, 138 within twenty days of either the signing of
the contract, the receipt of the contract by the athlete's school, or, if
no notification is given to the school, the date the athlete's eligibility
expires. 39 The twenty-day rescission period does not begin to run until
the last of these three events occurs. 40 Therefore, the athlete may re-
scind a contract long after entering into it. For example, if a collegian
in Tennessee signs a contract with an agent before the start of the
athlete's senior season, and neither the athlete nor the agent notifies
the school of that agreement, the athlete maintains the right to rescind
the agreement for twenty days after participating in the school's final
competition of the athlete's senior season. Of course, the failure to
notify the institution within seventy-two hours of the signing is a vio-
lation of state law.14 '
Tennessee law also requires that language be included in the con-
tract which puts the athlete on notice that signing the contract could
adversely affect the athlete's collegiate teammates. 42 This language,
43
while legally insignificant, appears to be aimed at the athlete's con-
least three situations in which a contract between an agent and athlete can arise:
(A) A contract to represent the student athlete in pursuing a professional sports ca-
reer;
(B) Loans or advances of money in any way connected with the student athlete pursu-
ing a professional sports career; or
(C) Providing services or material goods in any way connected with the student athlete
pursuing a professional career in sports.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2104(a)(2) (Supp. 1988). Tennessee's provision clearly discourages any
relationship between an agent and a collegiate athlete while the athlete is still eligible for colle-
giate play.
136. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2104(b)(4), (b)(8)(A) (Supp. 1988).
137. Id. § 49-7-2104(b)(4).
138. Id. § 49-7-2104(b)(l)(A).
139. Id. § 49-7-2104(b)(5)(A)(i)-(iii).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 49-7-2104(b)(4).
142. Id. § 49-7-2104(b)(2).
143. The following language must be included in the agency agreement in 10-point, bold
type:
IF YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT PRIOR TO YOUR LAST INTERCOLLEGIATE
GAME AND DO NOT NOTIFY YOUR COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY OF THIS
CONTRACT, YOUR TEAM MAY BE REQUIRED TO FORFEIT ALL GAMES IN
WHICH YOU PARTICIPATE THEREAFTER, AND YOU MAY CAUSE YOUR
TEAM TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR POSTSEASON GAMES.
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science. That is, by signing early, the athlete not only jeopardizes his
eligibility, but may cause the team to forfeit victories or prevent it
from competing in post season tournaments or bowl games.
While protecting the school and the athlete, Tennessee's law also
contemplates serious financial penalties for the non-compliant
agent. ' For example, an agent is not entitled to reimbursement for
"[a]ny money, things of value, extra benefits or any other form of
consideration given by" the agent to the collegian.145 Such benefits are
considered a "gift" and may be retained by the athlete upon rescis-
sion of the contract or if the contract is rendered void or unenforcea-
ble due to a violation of the act. Therefore, an agent who induces a
client with money or other gifts to sign a representation agreement is
incurring a substantial financial risk as Tennessee views the induce-
ment as a part of the cost of doing business in the state.
Additionally, and significantly, a Tennessee college or university
may recover from the athlete agent damages caused by that agent's
direct violation of the act. 47 Damages may include lost revenue from
television appearances, ticket sales, and participation in post-season
tournaments or bowl games. 148 Such revenue can range from a few
dollars to millions.
IV. FLORIDA'S NEW AGENT REGULATION
Three different bills directed at sports agent's abuses were filed dur-
ing the 1988 session of the Florida Legislature. 49 While each bill was
unique, all three were similar in certain respects. 50 The thrust of each
144. Id. §§ 49-7-2103(b)(2), -2104(b)(10), -2106, -2107.
145. Id. § 49-7-2104(b)(10).
146. Id.
147. Id. §§ 49-7-2103(a), -2106, -2107.
148. Id. § 49-7-2106.
149. Fla. H.B. 127 (1988); Fla. H.B. 1095 (1988); Fla. S.B. 73 (1988).
150. HB 127, sponsored by Representative Sidney Martin, Dem., Hawthorne, would have
regulated all athlete agent contracts with professional sports teams. It provided that the State
Athletic Commission would administer oral examinations to determine whether people were
qualified to be athlete agents. Also, it proposed to levy a license fee for agents of not more than
$500 annually, and would have required the filing of a surety bond of not less than $3,000. Fla.
H.B. 127, § 2, at 3-4 (1988). The commission would regulate agent contracts and fees agents
charge subject to certain limitations. Id. at 6. A series of prohibited acts by agents were enumer-
ated, and the proposal would have authorized the commission to impose a fine of up to $5,000
for violations. Id. at 7-8, 10-11.
HB 1095, sponsored by Representative James Burke, Dem., Miami, proposed to require all
athlete agents to register with the Department of State which would evaluate the qualifications of
the applicant. Fla. H.B. 1095, §§ 3-4 (1988). It did not specify the amount of the filing fee, but it
proposed to require agents to file either a surety bond in the amount of $100,000 or an appropri-
ate substitute. Id. § 9(l)-(2), at 6. It proposed that all agent contracts be filed with the Depart-
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was to eliminate the "bad" agent. The bills all adopted the older ap-
proach of oppressive regulation and attempted to insure that all peo-
ple who represent professional athletes meet certain levels of
competence and character. Each provided for a state administrative
agency to investigate applicants and to license those who meet the
standards. The agency also would regulate the agents after licensure.
The proposals included the requirement that a substantial surety bond
be posted by each athlete agent. To provide funds to pay for this regu-
latory structure, substantial filing fees would be set by the commis-
sion. Such a scheme was considered and rejected for at least two
reasons. First, the economic cost for a person to qualify as an agent
would be substantial. Thus, the number of agents would be signifi-
cantly reduced. Absent an agent's belief in a reasonable chance to rep-
resent a middle- to- high-round draft choice, compliance with the Act
might not prove economically sensible. Second, the practical result of
establishing such a licensing procedure would be similar to what has
apparently occurred in the states that have adopted similar processes;
i.e., the agents simply ignore the state regulation and do business
without complying. Since there was no legislative intent to provide for
adequate regulatory enforcement, it was likely that agents in Florida
similarly would ignore the provision if adopted. Adopting regulatory
schemes which would probably be ignored by a substantial number of
those regulated was thought to be poor public policy. The concept of
licensing after an evaluation of credentials was never seriously debated
by any committee of the Florida Legislature.
ment of State, and it regulated their contents. Id. § 12(l)-(5), at 8-9. Also, it proposed to
regulate the fees an athlete agent could charge, and required the establishment of a trust fund to
administer the payments received by the agent on behalf of the athlete. Id. §§ 13(2), 14, at 10-11.
It delineated a series of prohibited acts by the agent. Id. § 16, at 11-14. Many of these were
included in the Act as finally adopted by the Legislature. As sanctions, HB 1095 proposed to
provide void contracts with agents who have registered with the department. A person who acts
as an athlete agent without registering could be found guilty of a first degree misdemeanor. Id.
§§ 19-20, at 15.
SB 73, filed by Senator George Kirkpatrick, Dem., Gainesville, proposed to create a 10 mem-
ber Athlete Agent Regulatory Commission which would evaluate the qualifications of an athlete
agent to enable that person to represent all athletes who seek employment with a professional
team. Fla. S.B. 73, §§ 2(1), 8, at 2, 6 (1988). It proposed to require an annual filing fee in an
amount sufficient to administer the costs of the proposed legislation. Also, it proposed to re-
quire each agent to post a surety bond in the amount of $50,000, or an appropriate substitute.
Id. §§ 13-14(1), (2), at 8. Student athletes subject to the rules of the NCAA would be required to
give notice to their university that they had signed an agent contract. Id. § 18(2), at 11. The bill
was to impose a 10% cap on agent fees, and was to require the establishment of a trust fund. Id.
§ 19-20, at 11-12. The bill delineated a series of actions in which agent participation would be
prohibited. Id. §§ 23-24, 26-27, at 12-13. Contracts with unregistered agents would be void, and
a person acting as an agent without registering could be found guilty of a third-degree felony. Id.
§ 31-32, at 15.
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This approach was abandoned early in the legislative process. In its
place was substituted the concept of having agents register without
any background investigation or licensing procedure based on the
competency of the registrant. The emphasis was placed on providing
protection both for Florida colleges and universities as well as the ath-
letes enrolled in them, and on regulating the contract between the
agent and the athlete. 5 '
A. People to Whom the Act Applies
"Athlete agents" under the Act are people who recruit or solicit a
student athlete for the purpose of entering into an agent contract to
represent the athlete when the athlete seeks employment with a profes-
sional athletic team. 15 2 An agent also is defined as a person who for a
fee "procures, offers, promises, or attempts to obtain employment
for a student athlete with a professional sports team or as a profes-
sional athlete." 153 Anyone who acts in the manner outlined above is
an agent and subject to the remainder of the legislation, without ex-
ception. Therefore, any lawyer who represents an athlete for the pur-
poses regulated by the Act is an agent and must register and comply
with the Act's other provisions.
A "student athlete" is an athlete who practices for or participates
in intercollegiate athletics at a college or university located in Flor-
ida. 54 While the Act does not define the term "college or university,"
it regulates only those contracts by athletes who are subject to the
rules and regulations of the NCAA, the National Association for In-
tercollegiate Athletics, or the National Junior College Athletic Associ-
ation. "'55 Thus, the intent seems clear that the term college or
university includes any Florida junior college or four-year college or
university which is a member of one of three specifically mentioned
organizations. 5 6 The provisions of the registration portion of the Act,
as well as its other provisions, are inapplicable to an agent who repre-
sents athletes who are already professional or who are still in high
school. Students enrolled at colleges or universities outside of Florida
apparently are excluded from the Act's protection even if they or their
family reside in Florida.
151. Ch. 88-229, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 468.451-.454 (Supp. 1988)).
152. Id. § 2, 1988 Fla Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.452(2) (Supp. 1988)).
153. Id.
154. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.452(3) (Supp. 1988)).
155. Id. § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454 (Supp. 1988)).
156. Since nearly all the athletes who sign agent contracts are enrolled at colleges and univer-
sities which are members of the NCAA, this Article will discuss the rules and regulations of that
organization.
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Agents may attempt to avoid the registration requirements of the
Act ' by leaving the state to sign the representation contract with the
athlete. However, when a person directly or indirectly seeks to recruit
or solicit a student athlete, the person is acting as an agent for the
purposes of the Act. 58 Therefore anyone who solicits or recruits a stu-
dent athlete in Florida for the purpose of serving as an athlete agent is
subject to the Act, regardless of where the contract is signed.
Many agents have representatives or scouts who engage in much of
the preliminary contract and recruitment. In this situation, both the
principal agent and the representative would be subject to the terms of
the Act; the agent's representative would be "directly" recruiting and
soliciting, and the principal agent would be "indirectly" engaging in
the same activities. So too, if the agent attempts to solicit or recruit
the athlete by contacting a member of the athlete's family or a friend
for the purpose of furthering the recruitment or solicitation, these ac-
tions would be subject to the Act. 159
B. Registration of Agents
Under the Act, every athlete agent is required to register biennially
with the Florida Department of Professional Regulation (DPR).160
The process is not one of licensing in which the DPR would determine
whether the agent possesses certain minimum qualifications of compe-
tency; nor is there any requirement that a surety bond be posted be-
fore an agent can do business. Rather, a person desiring to do
business as an athlete agent simply would complete a registration form
provided by DPR and pay a registration fee. That fee will be set by
DPR in an amount not to exceed fifty dollars. Upon payment of the
registration fee and completion of the form, DPR will issue a registra-
tion certificate which entitles the individual to operate as an athlete
agent for two years. 61
Although the Act is silent as to the contents of the registration
form, apparently it envisions that at least the business address of the
agent will be included since it requires an athlete agent operating in
Florida to notify DPR of the change of business address within thirty
days. 62 Each person who acts as an agent must register even though
157. Id. § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.453 (Supp. 1988)).
158. Id. § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.452(2) (Supp. 1988)).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.453(1) (Supp. 1988)).
161. Id.
162. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.453(2) (Supp. 1988)).
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several people may be members of the same firm, business, or
agency. 163
The failure to comply with the registration provisions of the Act
will result in criminal sanctions. It is a third-degree felony if a person
"operates" as an athlete agent without complying with Act's registra-
tion provisions. 14 By its use of the term "operate,' 1 65 the Legislature
apparently intended to prohibit unregistered people from acting as
athlete agents. Therefore, if an agent directly or indirectly recruits an
athlete at a Florida college or university, that agent will be subject to
criminal penalties if the agent fails to register, regardless of the juris-
diction in which the contract is signed. The intent of the Legislature
was to protect Florida athletes and universities. The crime occurs
when the recruitment takes place in Florida when the recruiter has
been operating as an agent without registering.
C. Regulation of the Agent Contract
The most significant portion of the Act is section 4, which regulates
an agent contract or agreement in which the student athlete authorizes
an athlete agent to represent the athlete in the marketing of the ath-
lete's ability or reputation in a sport.'6 In this section, the Legislature
attempted to build into each agent contract protections for both the
student athlete and the university.
1. Notice to College or University
The chief protection for Florida colleges and universities is the noti-
fication provision.' 67 When a student athlete who is subject to the
rules of the NCAA enters into an agent contract with an athlete agent
or with a professional team, both the student athlete 68 and the athlete
agent' 6 have the affirmative duty to give written notice to the athletic
director or president of the athlete's university that the athlete has en-
tered into the contract. The notice must be given within seventy-two
hours of the signing of the contract or before the athlete practices or
163. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. §468.453(3) (Supp. 1988)).
164. Id. In Florida, a person convicted of a third degree felony may receive a term of impris-
onment not to exceed five years, FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (1987), and a fine which shall not
exceed $5,000, id. § 775.083(l)(c). An habitual offender may receive a greater sentence. Id. §
755.084.
165. Ch. 88-229, § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289, 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.453(3) (Supp.
1988)).
166. Id. § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454 (Supp. 1988)).
167. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(1) (Supp. 1988)).
168. Id.
169. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(2) (Supp. 1988)).
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participates in an athletic event on behalf of the college or the univer-
sity, whichever event occurs first. 170 Such notice will enable the univer-
sity to be aware that the student athlete's eligibility is in doubt, and
will give it the opportunity to take appropriate action before the stu-
dent athlete competes and jeopardizes both the institution and the ath-
lete's teammates.
The notice is required only from an athlete enrolled at a Florida
college or university because the Act's definition of "student athlete"
is limited to one "who practices for or otherwise participates in inter-
collegiate athletics at any college or university that is located in this
state.' ' 7' Thus, athletes who reside in Florida but attend a college or
university in another state are not subject to the notice provision upon
signing an agent contract. Further, athletes who are students at a col-
lege outside of Florida and who sign a contract with an agent residing
in Florida are not subject to the notice provision.
It is unclear whether a student athlete who has completed athletic
eligibility but remains enrolled at the college or university must com-
ply with these notice provisions. The Act requires the notice of the
contract when a "student athlete . . . is subject to the rules and regu-
lations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association."'' 72 For exam-
ple, a football or basketball player who has finished the fourth and
final year of eligibility ordinarily would remain in school during the
spring term to graduate. Student athletes remain subject to NCAA re-
gulations so long as they receive financial aid. The NCAA Bylaws deal
with the limits upon the receipt of job-related income by student ath-
letes who are "ineligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics,
but who [are] receiving institutional financial aid."'' 73 Thus, the Act
170. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(1), (2) (Supp. 1988)).
171. Id. § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.452(3) (Supp." 1988)).
172. Id. § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(1) (Supp. 1988)).
173. NCAA Bylaws § 15.2.6.4, reprinted in NCAA MANuAL, supra note 53, at 129. A stu-
dent athlete will not be eligible if financial aid is received in an amount which "exceeds the value
of tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books." NCAA Bylaws § 15.1,
reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 53, at 128. In determining the amount of financial aid
received, the institution must count various forms of non-summer employment related income.
NCAA Bylaws § 15.1.1(a), reprinted in NCAA MANuAL, supra note 53, at 128. Funds received
from a job, or a bonus, or salary from a professional sports organization following the final
season of eligibility, specifically are required to be counted. NCAA Bylaws §§ 15.1.1(e), 15.2.6,
reprinted in NCAA MANuAL, supra note 53, at 128, 131.
An institution is required to adjust the grant-in-aid of a student-athlete who receives a
bonus, salary or other compensation during the academic year (or thereafter) from
participation in an athletics event, so that the total amount from such sources, when
coupled with the institutional financial aid, does not exceed the value of a full grant-
in-aid for the balance of the academic year.
NCAA Bylaws § 15.3.1.4.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 53, at 133.
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seems to require notice when the student athlete who is receiving fi-
nancial aid signs an agent contract while enrolled as a student at the
college even if the athlete's four years of competition have been com-
pleted.
On the other hand, the notice provision was intended to protect the
university from a penalty as a result of permitting an ineligible player
to participate in an athletic contest in violation of NCAA rules. If the
player has completed eligibility, the athlete cannot compete in any ad-
ditional contests. Therefore, the purpose for requiring notice from
this athlete would not be furthered, since there is no interest of the
university to protect. This latter interpretation would seem to further
the intent of the legislation. However, the plain language of the Act
appears clearly to negate that intent, requiring notice even after eligi-
bility has been exhausted.
74
Although agent contracts entered into prior to October 1, 1988, gen-
erally are not subject to the provisions of the Act,1 75 it does provide
that if a student athlete who is subject to the rules and regulations of
the NCAA has signed an agent contract, both the student and the
agent must give the required notice to the university on October 1,
1988, even though the contract was signed prior to that date. 176 If the
student athlete was not enrolled at a college or university and was not
subject to the NCAA rules at that time, the notice would not be re-
quired. The obvious intent was to protect the university from permit-
ting athletes to compete while the institution believed that the athlete
had eligibility remaining, even though the athlete had signed an agent
contract prior to October 1, 1988.
2. Sanctions
Two provisions were included to provide an impetus for both the
student athlete and the agent to comply with the notice provision. The
first affects the contract and the second affects the parties to the con-
tract. One provision declares the contract void and unenforceable if
the required notice is not provided to the college or university.1 77 Both
the agent and the athlete are required to give notice. If either gives the
necessary notice to the university, the contract will not be rendered
void since the university's interest is protected as soon as it has knowl-
174. Ch. 88-229, § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289, 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454 (Supp.
1988)).
175. The Act took effect Oct. 1, 1988. Id. § 10, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1292 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 468.454 (Supp. (1988)).
176. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(3) (Supp. 1988)).
177. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(5) (Supp. 1988)).
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edge of the contract. Since the agent probably has a strong financial
motive to uphold the contract, it is likely the notice will be given. Ad-
ditionally, the Act provides that if the athlete agent fails to provide
the required notice, the agent may be found guilty of a third-degree
felony. 71
Rather than placing the entire burden on the agent, the Legislature
took a unique step in seeking to ensure that the student athlete will
fullfill his or her duty to give the required notice. The failure of the
student athlete to give timely notice is a first-degree misdemeanor. 79
This criminal penalty indicates that the Legislature primarily was seek-
ing to protect the interests of the Florida colleges and universities.
However, the effectiveness of this provision remains to be seen. If
athletes are willing to secretly sign agent contracts early, in violation
of NCAA rules, they may be equally willing to risk a possible misde-
meanor charge.
Allowing an ineligible athlete to compete in an NCAA champion-
ship event is a violation of NCAA rules,8 0 which may result in the
university being required to forfeit substantial revenues derived from
participating in the event. 81 The Act seeks to protect Florida colleges
and universities from this financial harm. It establishes a cause of ac-
tion on behalf of the college or university against both the agent and
the student athlete for any damages caused to the college or university
as a result of the failure to provide the required notification.182 The
damages could include any proceeds that the institution had to return
to the NCAA as well as any other financial loss the university could
prove was caused by the failure to have notice of the player's loss of
eligibility. 183
If the athlete's ineligibility becomes known before the champion-
ship event, the athlete will not be able to compete in the champion-
ship. Additionally, the team's eligibility to compete in the event might
be affected, either because it may have to forfeit games as a result of
using an ineligible player, 84 or the appropriate selection committee
178. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(2) (Supp. 1988)).
179. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(1) (Supp. 1988)). In Florida, a person convicted of
a first-degree misdemeanor may receive a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding one year,
FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (1987), and a fine not exceeding $1,000, id. § 775.083(1)(d). An habit-
ual offender may receive a greater sentence. Id. § 775.084.
180. See NCAA Bylaws § 14.1.1.1, reprinted in NCAA MANuAL, supra note 53, at 97.
181. See NCAA Exec. Reg. 31.2.2.5, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 53, at 310.
182. Ch. 88-229, § 5, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289, 1291 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(6) (Supp.
1988)).
183. Id.
184. NCAA Enforcement Rules § 19.6(b)-(c), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 53, at
254.
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does not believe that the team is worthy of selection. In this situation,
both the team and the university are damaged. However, it may be
difficult to prove the amount of the financial damages the university
has suffered. Generally, when the amount of damages caused to a per-
son are speculative, a judgment awarding damages usually may not be
awarded." s5 For example, the financial payout to each university com-
peting in the NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Tournament in-
creases with each game the team wins as it progresses to a later round
in the tournament. In this situation, it is probably not possible for a
university to prove the amount of damage it sustained if an ineligible
athlete had not competed. It cannot prove that its team would have
been selected for the tournament if the student athlete had been eligi-
ble for the entire season. If the team was selected, it would be very
difficult for the university to prove that its team would have pro-
gressed to a later round in the tournament had the student athlete
been eligible to compete.
The Act provides that if the university had not been notified of the
contract, it can recover liquidated damages in the amount equal to
three times the value of the athlete's scholarship furnished by the uni-
versity. It is not necessary that the university prove any actual damage
before these liquidated damages can be recovered.1 6 This provision
appears to permit the university to recover some of its monetary dam-
ages even though proof of actual amount of damage is not possible.
According to the legislative language, the recovery of liquidated
damages may be available in addition to any actual damages that can
be proved. The Act uses the term "treble damages.' ' 8 7 This provision
may have been intended to provide a civil penalty similar to other
treble damage provisions which provide an incentive to an injured per-
son to seek redress. It would operate to provide an additional deter-
rent against these violations.
The cause of action for damages is recognized only for a statutory
violation caused by the failure of the agent or athlete to give timely
notice. There is no similar cause of action recognized for other viola-
tions of the act.
3. Form of Agent Contract
To make the student athlete aware of his or her duties and the im-
plications of signing an agent contract, the Act requires that the con-
185. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 149 (1973) (the plaintiff is under the
obligation of proving the amount of damages suffered with reasonable certainty).
186. Ch. 88-229, § 5, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289, 1291 (codified at FLA. STAT. 468.454(6) (Supp.
1988)).
187. Id.
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tract include the following warnings near the space for the student
athlete's signature in ten point, bold type:
WARNING: IF YOU AS A STUDENT ATHLETE SIGN THIS
CONTRACT, YOU MAY LOSE YOUR ELIGIBILITY TO
COMPETE IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS. PURSUANT
TO FLORIDA LAW, YOU MUST NOTIFY THE ATHLETIC
DIRECTOR OR PRESIDENT OF YOUR COLLEGE OR
UNIVERSITY IN WRITING PRIOR TO PRACTICING FOR OR
PARTICIPATING IN ANY ATHLETIC EVENT ON BEHALF OF
ANY COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY OR WITHIN 72 HOURS
AFTER ENTERING INTO THIS CONTRACT, WHICHEVER
OCCURS FIRST. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS NOTICE IS A
CRIMINAL OFFENSE. 88
It is not clear whether these provisions invalidate oral agent con-
tracts. This legislative requirement seems to imply that all agent con-
tracts must be in writing. Oral contracts would by implication be
invalid and unenforceable or would not be controlled by the Act. If
oral contracts were be determined to be outside the Act, the notice
and other provisions likewise would be inapplicable to them.
On the other hand, the definition of an agent contract apparently
applies to all contracts or agreements and is not limited only to writ-
ten contracts. It provides that an agent contract is a "contract or
agreement pursuant to which a student athlete authorizes an athlete
agent to represent him in the marketing of his athletic ability or repu-
tation in a sport."' 18 9 Both oral and written contracts and agreements
would meet this definition. Thus, the required notice would have to be
given when an oral agreement is entered into between the agent and
the student athlete. This is the preferred interpretation since it furthers
the intent of the Legislature to protect Florida universities from being
harmed by playing ineligible athletes. Under the NCAA Bylaws, a per-
son loses eligibility in a sport when he or she contracts "orally or in
writing" to be represented by an agent in the marketing of his athletic
ability in a sport. 190 Thus, a student athlete who enters into an oral
agent contract or agreement is ineligible and should be required to
give the necessary notice. 191
The agent and the athlete may attempt to enter into a contract be-
fore the athlete has completed eligibility by postdating the contract
188. Id. § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1291 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(4) (Supp. 1988)).
189. Id. § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.452(1) (Supp. 1988)).
190. NCAA Bylaws § 12.3.1, reprinted in NCAA MAuAL, supra note 53, at 61.
191. Ch. 88-229, § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289, 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(1)-(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
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with a date subsequent to the completion of his eligibility. On the face
of the contract, it would appear that the parties did not violate the
provisions of this Act and did not jeopardize the athlete's eligibility.
However, a postdated contract is a violation of the act. 192 There are
no sanctions specified for general violations of the Act, except that
the agent's registration may be suspended or revoked for such a viola-
tion. 193
4. Athlete's Right of Recission
To protect the student athlete from the pressures that might be ex-
erted to sign an agent contract, the Legislature provided that the stu-
dent has the right to rescind an agent contract if the student complies
with the requirements of the section. 194 This right cannot be waived. 195
This provision is similar to other Florida consumer protection legisla-
tion that provides for similar rescissionary rights for certain types of
consumer contracts.196 Also it is based on a similar policy that under-
lies the NCAA legislation which provides for a non-contact period
with the athlete for two days before the date when the athlete can sign
a national letter of intent.197 The individual is provided a period of
time in which to consider the alternatives out of the presence of those
who seek to pressure the athlete into signing the contract or agree-
ment. 19
The athlete has ten days in which to rescind.' 99 The time runs either
from the date on which the contractual relationship arises between the
athlete and the agent or the date on which the college or university is
notified of the contractual relationship, whichever date is later. 20°
Coupling the right of rescission to the date of the notice rather than
the date the contract was signed gives a greater motive to the agent to
give timely notice.
192. Id. § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1292 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(8) (Supp. 1988)).
193. Id. § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1292 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.455 (Supp. 1988)).
194. Id. § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1291 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(7) (Supp. 1988)).
195. Id.
196. For example, a client may cancel a contingent fee contract with an attorney without any
reason if there is notice in writing within three days of the date the contract is signed, FLA. R.
PROF. COND. 4-1.5(F)(4)(a)(2), and a buyer of a motor vehicle has the right to rescind a retail
installment contract until the seller has delivered or mailed to the buyer a copy of the contract if
the buyer has not yet received the motor vehicle, FLA. STAT. § 520.07(l)(c) (1987).
197. NCAA Bylaws §§ 13.02.4.4, 13.1.3.8.1, reprinted in NCAA MANuAL, supra note 53, at
70, 77.
198. Ch. 88-229, § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289, 1291 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.454(7) (Supp.
1988)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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To be an effective rescission, the athlete must give written notice to
the agent and must repay the agent all monies paid by the agent to the
student athlete. 2°1 However, the Act provides that there need not be
reimbursement of any amounts expended by the agent on behalf of
the student athlete for travel, entertainment and room and board. 20 2
The policy decision apparently was based on the fact that it would be
difficult for the athlete to repay amounts which were not personally
received but were paid to third-party businesses on his or her behalf.
Not requiring the reimbursement of expenditures received on behalf
of the athlete may be in conflict with actions required by the NCAA
to restore the eligibility of a student athlete who had attempted to re-
scind an agent contract. Although an athlete loses NCAA eligibility
upon signing a contract with an agent, 20 3 at least one athlete's eligibil-
ity has been restored by the NCAA Eligibility Committee where all
monies paid directly and those spent on behalf of the student were
reimbursed. 204 While there is no assurance that eligibility will be re-
stored if there is complete reimbursement,205 it is doubtful that such
action would result without it. Thus under the Florida Act it is possi-
ble that an agent contract may be legally rescinded but the athlete may
be ineligible under NCAA rules for further competition.
Additionally, if the contract is rescinded, as a matter of substantive
contract law no contract exists.206 Obviously, a strong argument can
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. NCAA Bylaws § 12.3.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 53, at 61. See supra
note 55. A similar restriction is placed upon an individual with eligibility remaining who places
his or her name in a professional league's draft and subsequently withdraws from the draft
before it is held. NCAA Bylaws § 12.2.4.2 (a), reprinted in NCAA MAuAL, supra note 53, at
61.
204. The NCAA Eligibility Committee for Division I restored the final season of eligibility
for University of Pittsburgh student athlete Teryl Austin. Upon repayment of a loan of $2,500
received from the agent and confirmation that the student athlete was free of an contractual
obligations to the agent, the committee voted to restore Austin's eligibility after he was withheld
from the first two games of the 1987 varsity football schedule. NCAA News, Sept. 2, 1987, at 2,
col. 3.
205. Two Texas A&M football players who had signed agent contracts and received money
from the agent were unsuccessful in their attempt to have their eligibility restored even though
they agreed to make restitution to the agent and terminated all contractual obligations with him.
Apparently, the NCAA declined to restore their eligibility because the athletes did not come
forward and disclose the agent contracts until after the story was reported in the press; and
because when they renewed their scholarships they had signed documents which falsely asserted
that they had done nothing to jeopardize their eligibility. See Atlanta Const., Dec. 22, 1987, at
ID, col. 5, 6D col. 3 (quoting Steve Morgan, NCAA Asst. Exec. Dir.).
206. The duties under a contract are terminated when a contract is rescinded. Usually there
must be a mutual agreement of the parties to the contract to rescind. The Legislature has given
the student athlete the unilateral right to rescind if he or she complies with the statute. See
generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: ONE VOLUmE EDITION § 1234 (1952).
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be made that since there is no enforceable contractual agreement with
the agent, the student should not lose eligibility. However, the NCAA
Bylaws provide that if an individual has signed a contract or commit-
ment of any kind to play professional athletics in a sport, the athlete
is no longer eligible to compete in that sport, regardless of the "legal
enforceability" of the contract or commitment. 20 7 Thus, it seems that
in the eyes of the NCAA, an athlete will be ineligible to compete even
though the athlete has no valid contract with an agent.
D. Regulation of Agent's Conduct
While the Act generally regulates the agent contract, it goes beyond
this concept and specifically prohibits five types of activities by
agents. 208 It prohibits the publication of false or misleading informa-
tion or advertisements by an agent. 209 Additionally, it forbids giving
any false information or the making of false promises concerning em-
ployment to an athlete.210 This section applies not only to an agent
who directly makes the false statement or representation, but also to
an agent causing another to make such misrepresentations. Thus, not
only would an agent violate the Act by directly misrepresenting his
credentials or client list, but he would also be in violation by causing
his representative or scout to do so.
The remainder of that section deals with offers or payments by the
agent of valuable considerations to induce an athlete to sign an agent
contract. If a coach or an employee of a Florida college or university
refers an athlete to an agent, the agent is prohibited from offering
anything of value in exchange 'for the referral. 21' In addition to a
broad prohibition against offering any consideration, the Act specifi-
cally prohibits the rendition of free legal services and the rendition of
legal services for a reduced fee by the agent in exchange for the refer-
ral. 212 The reference to an employee of the university most frequently
would apply to the staff of the athletic department, such as trainers or
members of the athletic director's staff, but also would apply to non-
athletic department employees, most frequently university faculty.
The Act prohibits the agent from accepting as a client any athlete re-
ferred by a coach or employee who has been offered anything of
207. NCAA Bylaws § 12.1.3 (a), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 53, at 59.
208. Ch. 88-229, § 8, 1988 Fla. Laws 1289, 1292 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.456 (Supp.
1988)).
209. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.456(1) (Supp. 1988)).
210. Id.
211. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.456(2) (Supp. 1988)).
212. Id.
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value. 2 3 Additionally, it prohibits the agent from entering into a writ-
ten or oral agreement with a coach or employee in which the agent
offers anything of value for the referral of the student athlete.21 4
There appears to be little reason for having two separate provisions
covering the same matter. The two subsections basically provide that
if an agent offers anything of value to a coach or employee for a re-
ferral of the athlete, the agent cannot accept the athlete as a client and
any agreement between the agent and the coach or employee is inva-
lid.
An agent is prohibited from offering anything of value to induce
the athlete to enter into an agreement under which the agent will rep-
resent the athlete. 215 Specifically exempted are negotiations regarding
the agent's fee. 216 Negotiations over the amount of the agent's fee may
occur and it will not be regarded as a breach of the act. 21 7 An agent is
not prohibited from offering the athlete a lower fee to obtain the sig-
nature of the athlete on the contract. 21 1 Under this provision, the Act
would be violated if the agent offered the athlete an automobile or a
cash payment to induce the athlete to sign the agent contract. How-
ever, the provision is not limited to payments or other offers of value
directly to an athlete who the agent is attempting to sign. The provi-
sion states that the "agent shall not offer anything of value to induce
a student athlete to enter into an agreement. ' ' 21 9 Payments or offers to
members of the athlete's family or to his friends similarly would be
prohibited. If the registration of the athlete agent has been suspended,
the agent shall not conduct business as an athlete agent. 220
While there are criminal penalties attached to violations of other
parts of the legislation, and failure to comply with specific provisions
will result in a void agent contract, there are no specific sanctions for
the violation of the regulation provisions regarding the agent's con-
duct. If an agent fails to comply with any of the provisions, the
agent's registration may be revoked or suspended. 221 If such suspen-
sion or revocation occurs, it would be a third-degree felony for the
agent to operate as an athlete agent. 222
213. Id.
214. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.456(3) (Supp. 1988)).
215. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.456(4) (Supp. 1988)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.456(5) (Supp. 1988)).
221. Id. § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1292 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.455 (Supp. 1988)).
222. Id. § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1290 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.453(3) (Supp. 1988)).
SPORTS A GENTS A CT
The failure to provide additional criminal or civil remedies for the
prohibited actions of an agent does not mean that the athlete is with-
out recourse if the agent's violation of the statute's provisions were
the cause of damages. Some other independent basis for the cause of
action may be present. For example, if the athlete sued the agent al-
leging that the agent's negligence in representing his qualifications
caused the athlete monetary loss, the athlete could rely on the viola-
tion of the statute prohibiting the agent from publishing false or mis-
leading statements as being negligence per se or evidence of
negligence. Additionally, the criminal statutes of Florida or another
jurisdiction might provide that the conduct in question is criminal,
even though it is not criminal under the Act. Making false and mis-
leading statements might very well be a violation of state or federal
criminal statutes which generally prohibit that type of activity. 223
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Legislature has made an earnest attempt to combat the
havoc that unscrupulous agents can create. State lawmakers exhibited
keen hindsight by avoiding the burdensome and ineffective registra-
tion and bonding requirements used in some states. 224 Additionally,
Florida has included two provisions in its law which will give the
sports agent legislation a fighting chance.
First, Florida has developed guidelines for both the sports agent
and the athlete. In so doing, Florida appropriately recognizes that, in
many cases, the collegiate athlete is as guilty of an indiscretion as the
sports agent. Indeed, collegians know NCAA rules as well as or better
than the sports agents who recruit them so doggedly. Yet, like the
agent, the athletes ignore those rules, their scholarship commitment to
their university, and, in some instances, state law, to satisfy their
monetary appetites. The victims, at least in the agent-athlete scenario,
are the colleges and universities which attempt to run respectable, law-
abiding sports programs. While their athletes may quiver at such legis-
lation, these institutions will find a degree of solace in sports agent
legislation like that found in Florida.
Second, the Florida legislation prescribes criminal sanctions for
those agents and athletes who violate the law."' The spectre of prison
may be just the remedy to harness the vigor of even the most enthusi-
astic agent. Further, an athlete may attract less attention from profes-
223. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 164, 178-79 and accompanying text.
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sional teams if the athlete faces a criminal conviction. Mere threats?-
perhaps. But Jim Abernathy's experience in Alabama may supply the
appropriate response to those agents and athletes who may want to
test a state's interest in curbing abuses.
Florida's new legislation ultimately may prove effective in prevent-
ing the type of nightmare experienced at the University of Alabama in
1987.226 However, it is obvious that state legislation is not a panacea
for combatting the unscrupulous sports agent. This is true primarily
because only seventeen states have passed agent legislation. The bad
agent is a persistent predator who will continue to feed in those states
that do not have legislation. Moreover, experience has proved that
agent legislation in some states is flatly ignored. But it appears that
Florida has passed legislation which cannot simply be ignored-at
least by those agents and athletes who want to avoid criminal sanc-
tions.
The price of playing the game in Florida will be steep indeed.
226. See Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1987, at 37, col. 5.
